Trump Says “Someone Else” Should Negotiate for Ukraine — Witkoff Heads to Oslo, Then to Putin

On October 20, 2026, Donald Trump did what Kyiv had feared for months. He publicly, without diplomatic niceties, said that Ukraine’s president should no longer lead peace talks.

“It’s time for someone else to negotiate on behalf of Ukraine,” Trump told reporters before leaving for a rally in Kansas, responding to Zelenskyy’s earlier comment that the U.S. risked ending up “on the wrong side of history.” Trump did not name a replacement. But the message was unmistakable: the leader of Ukraine’s main military donor no longer considers Zelenskyy a credible negotiating partner.

And this was not just rhetoric.

That same day, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff flew to Oslo. He is scheduled to meet Zelenskyy, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, and representatives from Germany, the UK, France, Poland, and NATO. But the key detail comes next: after Oslo, Witkoff will travel to Moscow for talks with Vladimir Putin.

The itinerary is clear: hear Ukraine and Europe out, then discuss terms with the Kremlin. The final decision, it seems, will be made without Kyiv.

Trump has confirmed he is ready for a trilateral meeting with Putin and Xi Jinping — possibly on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen on November 18–19. Ukraine is not on the guest list. The idea for such a summit, according to the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, was floated by Putin during his phone call with Trump on October 9. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov cautiously confirmed that the topic is being discussed, though “there is no concrete plan yet.”

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha responded predictably: discussing Ukraine’s fate without Ukraine is unacceptable, and a meeting of the leaders of Russia, China, and the U.S. would “only encourage Putin to continue the war.” These are correct words. But behind them lies emptiness.

Because what can Kyiv actually do?

In recent days, Trump suspended sanctions imposed under the “Lindsey Graham Act” (HR 5334), which he himself signed on September 18. The October 16 executive order effectively halted the application of tariffs and restrictions against Russia. Zelenskyy has publicly complained about disruptions in intelligence sharing — specifically, the U.S. failed to warn Ukraine about a ballistic missile strike on Kyiv on October 18 (16 missiles). Data exchange has resumed, he says, but not fully.

Trump’s response: Ukraine “has done nothing for the U.S.” in return for American aid. He also said Russia is “behaving normally toward Ukraine” and “is not doing everything it is capable of.”

This is not just rhetoric. It is a shift in optics: Washington no longer treats Russia as the default aggressor. And it no longer sees Zelenskyy as a partner worth negotiating with.

Notably, Jared Kushner, Trump’s special representative, has the flu and will not attend the Oslo meeting in person — he will participate remotely. A small detail, but it speaks to the level of attention.

On the night of October 20, Russia struck the Kyiv region again — three dead, six wounded. The day before, a strike on Nova Vodolaha killed six, including two children. The war continues. But the main talks about ending it, it appears, will take place in a different room.

Kyiv has one lever left: public diplomacy and appeals to European allies. But Europe is not the main player in this story either. Germany, Britain, France, Poland — they will be in Oslo. But the decisive word, it seems, has already been spoken by Trump, Putin, and possibly Xi.

The formula “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” is a fine principle. But in a world where one president calls another “not the one to negotiate,” and a special envoy flies to Moscow after a brief stop in Oslo, that principle becomes a decoration.

The question is not whether Kyiv wants to be at the table. The question is whether a seat has been left for it.